Technological spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI) have been regarded as a major source of technical progress and productivity growth. This paper explores the role of international and intranational technological spillovers from FDI in technical change, efficiency improvement, and total factor productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing firms using a recent Chinese manufacturing firm-level panel data set over the 2001-05 period. International industry-specific research and development (R&D) stock is linked to the Chinese firm-level data, international R&D spillovers from FDI and intranational technological spillovers of R&D activities by foreign invested firms in China are examined as well. Policy implications are discussed.
Introduction
Three decades of the Chinese economy's fast economic growth has attracted substantial research interest. This impressive growth performance is not only due to factor accumulation, but to productivity growth as well. As the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient in the developing world, how much has China beneªted from the huge inºows of FDI? Technology transfer through FDI has been regarded as a major engine of technological upgrading in developing countries for a long period. What are the roles of international and intranational research and development (R&D) spillovers in the technical progress and productivity growth in China? Can developing countries rely on foreign technology to catch up with the industrialized countries?
Empirical evidence on the impact of FDI on the productivity growth of indigenous ªrms is mixed (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; Aitken and Harrison 1999; Görg and Greenaway 2001; Javorcik 2004) . It is found that intranational knowledge spillovers are a more important source of technological progress than the international spillovers for the United States and Japan (Branstetter 2001) . In the context of China, Hu and Jefferson (2002) ªnd signiªcant productivity depression rather than positive spillover effects of FDI on domestic ªrms. Using cross-section data for 1995, Buckley, Clegg, and Wang (2002) ªnd that non-Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) generate technological and international market access spillover beneªts for Chinese ªrms, whereas overseas Chinese investors confer only market access beneªts. Spatially, Chen, Li, and Shapiro (2008) ªnd that in locations with a strong clustering of innovative foreign ªrms, local ªrms beneªt from knowledge spillovers, but not in locations where foreign concentration is measured by employment or capital. These studies provide useful insights. However, foreign knowledge and the spillovers from FDI are often tested using an output/employment/asset share of foreign invested ªrms or productivity or R&D activities of foreign ªrms in the same industry or region. Although there are some studies that have tested the spillovers of international knowledge stock through international trade and FDI at the country and industry levels directly (e.g., Coe and Helpman 1995) , no study at ªrm level has tested the international knowledge on spillovers directly. This paper explores the role of inter-and intranational technological spillovers from FDI in technical change, efªciency improvement, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Chinese manufacturing ªrms using a recent Chinese manufacturing ªrm-level panel data set of 56,125 ªrms over the 2001-05 period. International industryspeciªc R&D stock is linked to the Chinese ªrm-level data by corresponding industry and adjusted by industry-and ªrm-level degrees of openness. Therefore, we employ two sources of R&D spillovers from FDI: R&D spillovers from innovation activities by foreign invested ªrms in the same industry and international R&D spillovers through FDI. We use the non-parametric frontier technique to decompose the TFP growth of ªrms into technical change and efªciency improvement. Unlike most of the existing studies that estimate TFP using a single unchanging production function across industries, this study allows for the differences in production technology across industries, and TFP is estimated for each industry separately. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework on international and intranational R&D spillovers. Section 3 discusses the data, model, and methodology. Section 4 presents empirical evidence. Section 5 provides conclusions.
Theoretical framework and innovation in China
The literature presents two alternative perspectives for the choice of technology development paths for developing countries. One perspective proposes that FDI technology transferred from developed countries has positive effects on developing countries (Eden, Lecitas, and Martinez 1997; Kokko, Tansini, and Zejan 1997) , and therefore, the technology spillover effects of FDI may be more important than the effects of domestic investments (Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee 1995) . The degree of technology diffusion from FDI grows with the increase in technology distance between the hosts and the foreign countries (Findlay 1978) . The greater the technology distance, the more difªcult it becomes for developing countries to boost independent innovation.
Another outlook is that the introduction of FDI will make the competing domestic ªrms worse off (Aitken and Harrison 1999) , and will reduce the R&D efforts of local ªrms (OECD 2002) . Furthermore, the beneªts of FDI technology spillovers are limited because most techniques transferred from foreign investment ªrms are usually mature techniques, not core techniques; and as the working conditions and rewards of overseas-funded ªrms are better than that of native ªrms, knowledge diffusion caused by turnover of native talented personnel is usually one-way from the native ªrms to overseas-funded ªrms. Moreover, technologies created in the industrialized countries are argued to be biased to the factor endowment of the country where the technology is developed, and therefore are capital and skilled-labor augmenting (Basu and Weil 1998; Acemoglu 2002) . The advanced foreign technology, therefore, may not be appropriate for developing countries given their different factor, economic, and social conditions (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Stewart 1983) . Finally, considering that technology progress has the characteristic of path dependence, a country that is dependent on the technology spillover of FDI for a long period will later limit its independent innovation. Therefore, strengthening R&D and enhancing the independent creative abilities should be the main path for developing countries' technological advancement. Taking into account the pros and cons of the foreign and indigenous innovation, Lall (2003) argues that neither autonomous innovations nor FDI-reliant strategies can be used independently.
Theoretically, FDI contributes to technological upgrading in the host economy in several ways. First, advanced technology embedded in imported machinery and equipment can lift the level production technology of the host economy. Second, R&D and other forms of innovation generated by foreign ªrms and R&D labs of MNEs increase the innovation outputs in the country directly (Athreye and Cantwell 2007) . Third, FDI may contribute to the local innovation system by bringing in advanced management practices and thus improving the innovation efªciency of the local innovation system (Fu 2008a) . Finally, technological spillovers from foreign innovation activities may inºuence technical change and the catch-up of indigenous ªrms. Knowledge spillovers from foreign to local ªrms may take place through knowledge transfer within the supply chain, skilled labor turnovers, demonstration effects when local ªrms are learning by imitation, and competition effects when the competitive pressure caused by foreign presence forces the local ªrms to improve their production technology and management.
However, foreign R&D activities could also generate negative externalities to the domestic innovation activities. These negative effects could occur if foreign ªrms exploit their superior technology and marketing power to force local competitors to reduce their outputs or if they attract the most talented researchers and compete in the markets of innovation products that threaten local ªrms, or SMEs in particular (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Fu 2004 Fu , 2007 Aghion et al. 2005; UNCTAD 2005) . Moreover, there are several reasons that local ªrms might not be able to enjoy the FDI spillover effects efªciently. First, knowledge transfer via supply chain requires effective linkages between foreign ªrms and local suppliers and customers (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford 1996; Fu 2004) . Second, signiªcant spillovers from FDI on local ªrms are also subject to sufªcient absorptive capacity of the local ªrms and organizations (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Girma 2005; Fu 2008a ). Third, the appropriateness of the technology embedded in FDI affects the sign and signiªcance of the productivity effects of FDI spillovers. Technologies created in industrialized countries are argued to be biased to the factor endowment of the country where the technology is developed (Basu and Weil 1998; Acemoglu 2002) . Finally, different types of FDI have markedly different productivity spillover effects (Drifªeld and Love 2003) .
Since it launched the economic reforms and invited foreign capital participation in its economy in 1979, China has received a large volume of international direct investment ºows and stands as the second largest FDI recipient in the world. In 2004, FDI inºows into China reached a historical peak of US$ 60.63 billion (Figure 1 ). The sources of inward FDI in China have also evolved over time. While investment from overseas Chinese ªrms in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan were the major sources of inward FDI in the 1980s, the 1990s saw increasing inward FDI from the major industrialized countries and other OECD countries.
Innovation efforts in China have grown rapidly during the past two decades. The total R&D expenditure in China has grown from 7.4 billion Yuan in 1987 to 300.3 billion Yuan in 2006, with an average annual growth rate of 15 percent ( Figure  2 ). Since the late 1990s, with the increasing globalization in innovation, R&D activities of foreign ªrms in China have been increasing, at a faster pace than that of the domestic ªrms. The average annual growth of R&D expenditure over the 1998-2004 period was 38 and 33 percent in foreign invested enterprises and Ethnic Chinese invested ªrms, 1 respectively. This is much higher than that of indigenous ªrms at 25 percent over the same time period.
Given the fact that foreign investors in China are mostly market-or resource-or cheap labor-seeking processing types, R&D spillovers from foreign invested ªrms are likely to be limited. Moreover, motivations, technology levels, endowments, and access to advanced technological and managerial knowledge all are different between foreign and ethnic investments. The productivity effects of foreign and ethnic investments are likely to be different.
Data and methodology

Data
The empirical work is based on the Chinese manufacturing ªrm-level data set and the international industry-speciªc R&D stock data set. The Chinese ªrm-level data (ii) collectively owned, (iii) privately owned, (iv) foreign-owned, and (v) others. Foreign-owned ªrms are further divided into ªrms with investments from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao investors (so-called ethnic ªrms) and from other foreign sources (foreign invested enterprises; FIEs). "Other" ªrms are mainly shareholding enterprises.
As we are interested in the technology spillover effects from foreign ªrms on domestic ªrms, the econometric work is conªned to domestic-owned enterprises. We, however, use the full sample to construct myriad variables of interest, such as the share of foreign ªrms in an industry-region or the Herªndahl index of market concentration. The ªnal data set consists of 269,905 observations from 53,981 ªrms. We include only those ªrms with the full set of observations during the sample period as estimation of TFP growth and its components using DEA analysis, which requires balanced data sets. Table 1 reports the ownership structure of ªrms for each industry. Of the total 29 SIC two-digit manufacturing industries under study, 7 of them are dominated by FIEs that produce more than 50 percent of the total outputs. In cultural, educational and sports goods, electronic and telecommunications, and instruments and meters, foreign ªrms produce even 70 to 80 percent of the country's total output. This is phenomenal given the size of the Chinese industry. In these three categories and the apparel industries, more than 20 percent of the ªrms are invested through foreign capital mainly from OECD countries. Table 2 sees a steady modest growth in the portion of ªrms that invest in R&D across all industries over the sample period. The medical and pharmaceutical, tobacco, and electronic and telecommunications industries top the chart with 50, 45, and 33 percent innovative ªrms, respectively.
International industry-speciªc R&D stock is linked explicitly to the Chinese ªrm-level data. Coe and Helpman (1995) , research and development capital stocks (S), which are deªned here as beginning of period stocks, were calculated from R&D expenditure (R) based on the perpetual inventory model as
Here ␦ is the depreciation or obsolescence rate, which was assumed to be 5, 10 and 15 percent, alternatively. The benchmark for S was calculated following the procedure suggested by Griliches (1979) , as S 0 ϭ R 0 /(g ϩ ␦), where g is the average annual logarithmic growth of R&D expenditures over the period for which published R&D data were available, R 0 is the ªrst year for which the data were available, and S 0 is the benchmark for the beginning of the year. The domestic R&D capital stocks were converted into euros at 2000 constant price. The R&D stocks of the 22 OECD countries are then summed to proxy the world R&D stock.
Methodology
For the empirical test, we ªrst estimate TFP growth using the Malmquist index, and decompose it into technical progress and efªciency change. Secondly, we use econo- metric techniques to estimate the impact of technological spillovers of FDI on TFP growth, technical change, and efªciency improvement. TFP is estimated for each industry separately, allowing for different technology and production functions.
Due to the limitations of the traditional parametric approach, this paper estimates TFP growth by using a non-parametric programming method developed by Fare et al. (1994) . Following Fare et al.'s approach, a production frontier is constructed based on all the existing observations. The distance of each of the observations from the frontier is estimated by using non-parametric programming methods. Technical efªciency is deªned as the distance of each observation relative to the frontier. TFP growth is deªned as a geometric mean of two Malmquist productivity indexes, which is to be estimated as the ratios of distance functions of observations from the frontier. This approach has the advantage in that it allows for the decomposition of productivity growth into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive components:
(1) efªciency change in movements toward (or away from) the frontier, which is a measurement of catching-up; and (2) technical change measured by shifts in technological frontier (Fare et al. 1994 ). This decomposition of TFP growth enables us to investigate the impact of foreign and indigenous innovation efforts on technical progress and technological catch-up. Assuming a production technology that produces a vector of outputs, y R t M ∈ + , by using a vector of inputs, x R t N ∈ + , for each time period t ϭ 1, . . . , T, the output-based Malmquist productivity change index is deªned as the geometric mean of two Malmquist productivity indices as follows:
A value greater than 1 indicates positive TFP growth in period tϩ1. When performance deteriorates over time, the Malmquist index will be less than 1. Rewriting equation (1), we have 
where
and
TFP change is thus decomposed into two components: efªciency change and technical change. Efªciency change measures whether production is getting closer to or farther away from the frontier, reºecting the changes in x-efªciency. Technical change captures the shift in technology between the two periods. A value greater than one indicates catch-up with the frontier or technical progress. A value less than 1 indicates deterioration in performance. Scale efªciency is deªned as the ratio of technical efªciency calculated under the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) to technical efªciency calculated under the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS) (Fare et al. 1994) . It measures how close a ªrm is to the most productive scale size. In this paper, output is measured by total output of ªrm, inputs are capital measured by net ªxed assets, labor measured by number of employees, and intermediate inputs measured by variable costs. We use the output-oriented model under VRS for estimation.
Following the decomposition of productivity growth, the next step is to estimate the determinants of TFP growth, technical change, and efªciency improvement and to investigate the impact of indigenous innovation efforts and foreign R&D spillover effects on productivity growth and its components. R&D variables and FDI vari-ables are two sets of variables that are of interest. In our speciªcation, there are three types of innovation efforts: ªrm level, industry level, and international level. We construct the variables as follows: (1) at the ªrm level, R&D intensity is used as the direct effect of innovation on a ªrm's growth performance; (2) at the industry level, innovation effect in each of the 171 three-digit industries and 31 provinces are constructed as the proportion of R&D expenditure accounted for by different ownership types in the same industry and region; (3) the interaction terms of international industry speciªc R&D stock and FDI share at both the ªrm and industry level are adopted to measure the international innovation effect through FDI spillover effects. FDI is represented by two variables-the share of foreign and ethnic capital at the ªrm level. Therefore, the empirical analysis of the indigenous and foreign technology spillovers on the technology upgrading of indigenous ªrms are based on the model as follows,
where the dependent variable p represents TFP growth, technical change, and efªciency improvement, respectively. r f is ªrm R&D intensity, r s is a vector of industry-level R&D spillovers variables measured by industry average R&D intensity by different ownership types, r w is world R&D stock constructed from OECD STAN database as discussed earlier, and f f and f s are FDI intensity at the ªrm level and industry level, respectively. FDI intensity is further divided into foreign and ethnic capital intensity and enters the regression at the same time. X is a vector of control variables; D is the full set of time, sector, and year dummies, and e is a random error term.
The choice of control variables is guided by the existing empirical literature on the determinants of TFP growth (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1999; Aw, Chung, and Roberts 2000; Fu 2005 Fu , 2008b Huang (2003) argues forcefully that a sizable portion of FDI (especially joint venture and acquisition FDI) in China has grown in response to the insolvency problems facing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This suggests that industry-regional speciªc FDI might be endogenous in the sense that foreign-invested enterprises might be attracted to sectors or regions in which the performance of SOEs is weakest. The use of industry and region dummies in the regressions is designed to mitigate this potential endogeneity problem. However, in order to guard against further endogeneity problems unaccounted for by these (time-invariant) dummies, and to ensure the robustness of our results, we implement the FDI variables with their lagged values, the growth of total industry sales and changes in the output share of SOEs, and the proportion of loss-making SOEs, calculated at the industry and region 5 level.
There are good reasons to suspect that R&D, labor training, and foreign capital participation are potentially endogenous, even after controlling for ªxed effects. For example, ªrms with relatively many R&D activities are more likely to have higher TFP growth and faster technical change than others. However, it is possible that ªrms with a higher growth rate will invest more in R&D activities to keep their technology advantages. Another example is the foreign share of a ªrm. Firms with a higher foreign share could have better access to foreign technology and therefore have higher growth rates. However, there also might be a "cherry-picking" effect (Huang 2003) where foreign ªrms choose the faster-growing ªrms to invest in. Similar arguments can also be made in the case of export and ethnic capital participation.
We employ the ªxed effects generalized method of a moments regression technique (see, inter alia, Hansen 1982 and Arellano and Bond 1991) to deal with the endogeneity problem. Lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables are used as instruments. In addition, the shares of foreign and ethnic ªrms in the industry and region are used as extra instruments. We assume that a sector might be more efªcient than others if there are more foreign ªrms or ethnic ªrms participating in it, given the low level of competition from state-owned ªrms. We formally test whether the assumption of endogeneity is borne out by the data at hand and whether our instruments are relevant in that they exhibit sufªciently strong correlation with the potential endogenous variables. We also carefully test for the appropriateness of the instrumental variable candidates using Hansen's J test for over identifying restrictions and the validity of the instruments with Sargan test. Reassuringly, we ªnd that our instruments are appropriate on all counts.
Results
Estimated TFP growth and its decomposed components for each industry are reported in Table 3 . From all industries, the Chinese ªrms have experienced considerable TFP growth over the 2001-05 period at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent.
The growth is mainly due to technical change at an average annual growth rate of 4.3 percent rather than efªciency change. The average annual growth rate of efªci-ency improvement was only 0.7 percent over the sample period, which suggests limited catch-up process of the followers to the innovation leaders in the Chinese manufacturing sector.
The growth is widely spread across different sectors. The industries in which foreign ªrms have obvious dominance include electronic and telecommunications, instruments and meters, culture, educational and sports goods, as well as the garment and leather products industries where ethnic ªrms have a clear lead. Indigenous ªrms have a dominant presence in the food-processing, beverage, tobacco, timber process, paper-making, printing, petrol reªning, chemical ªber, smelting and processing of ferrous and nonferrous metals, metal products, and transport equipment industries, although the lead may be contributed to by different indigenous sectors in different industries.
Following Table 3 , it is interesting to see that industries in which foreign ªrms produce more than 50 percent of the total outputs have a higher efªciency change rate but a lower technical change rate, as well as lower TFP growth rate than those industries dominated by indigenous ªrms. For example, among those industries dominated by FIE, the garment and other ªber products industry enjoy the highest efªci-ency rate (14.4 percent) and the lowest technical change rate (10 percent). It might suggest that foreign ªrms are more likely to keep their technical advantage in their home countries, and are more reluctant to improve their technical efªciency than their Chinese competitors are. Meanwhile, they focus on adapting their technology to the local technological frontier. Table 4 reports both the OLS and the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimates of effects of technological spillovers from foreign innovation efforts on the TFP of indigenous ªrms. Results from the Wu-Hausman speciªcation test suggest signiªcant endogeneity between R&D, exports, and FDI on one hand and the dependent variable on the other. The GMM estimation results is therefore preferred to the OLS estimates. For a robustness check, estimated results of the basic model and models with industrial and international R&D spillovers at three alternative depreciation rates were applied. The estimated coefªcients from different model speciªcations are consistent suggesting the robustness of the estimated results. We have only reported the results with a 10 percent R&D depreciation rate due to space limitation.
Determinants of productivity growth
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In terms of the coefªcients of the control variables, we ªnd that they all turn out as expected. Firms with better initial technical efªciency tend to grow more slowly. Smaller ªrms appear to be more productive. Firms with high export-intensity, high FDI-intensity, more training, and greater intangible assets have higher TFP growth than those who lack these characteristics. These estimated results are robust and statistically signiªcant across industry sectors and different model speciªcations. Firm age does not appear to be a signiªcant factor. Interestingly, industry concentration and low levels of competition seem to increase ªrm productivity although the estimated coefªcient loses its statistical signiªcance when international R&D spillovers are controlled. The variables of most interest to us are, as we mentioned previously, the sets of R&D and FDI variables. Indigenous R&D efforts have a signiªcant positive impact on ªrm-level TFP growth. The estimated coefªcients bear the expected positive sign, and are statistically signiªcant across different model speciªcations. R&D spillovers from domestic ªrms in the same industry exert a signiªcant positive effect on the TFP growth of indigenous ªrms. However, it is interesting to see that innovation efforts from the FIEs in the same industry show a negative and signiªcant impact on Chinese manufacturing ªrms, and there is no signiªcant impact from ethnic ªrms at the same industry. This is likely because of either the competition effects of foreign R&D on the indigenous ªrms, or because the technologies developed by these sectors are not appropriate for the current technology frontier.
As we expected, both foreign and ethnic capital participations foster Chinese domestic ªrms' productivity growth. Foreign capital has a bigger inºuence on ªrm's growth than ethnic capital and both magnitudes of the coefªcients have been doubted when international R&D spillover effects are controlled. For example, the estimate result based on the industrial level indicates that a 10 percent increase in the share of foreign capital leads to a 2.5 percentage point increase in the rate of productivity growth, whereas a 10 percent increase in the share of ethnic capital only leads to 1.7 percentage point growth. However, both growth rates increase to 5.6 and 4.9 percentage points, respectively at the speciªcation with international R&D spillovers. It might suggest that domestic ªrms with foreign capitals have better channels to foreign advanced technical and management knowledge compared to their competitors with only ethnic capital participations.
The estimated coefªcients on international R&D spillover variables are statistically negatively signiªcant for ªrms with foreign and ethnic capitals at the ªrm level, but insigniªcant for ªrms with ethnic capitals at the industry level. It is likely to be explained by their inappropriate nature in the developing country context and the strong intellectual property rights protection in the high-technology industries. In addition, we should bear in mind that the international R&D spillover data are from the OECD countries, which might have a limited knowledge transfer through the ethnic channel. Table 5 reports the estimated result on the impact of indigenous innovation efforts and foreign R&D spillovers on technical change and efªciency improvements of the indigenous ªrms. We ªnd no systematic relationship between the age of the ªrm and both technical change and efªciency improvement. Bigger ªrms appear to have experienced faster rates of technical change across all speciªcations. However, the effect of size is not statistically signiªcant to efªciency improvement. Exports contribute to efªciency change and catch-up, but not the shift of the technology frontier. This result is consistent with the ªndings in Fu (2005) , which uses Chinese industrylevel panel data and suggests that the focus on low-cost competitiveness based on cheap unskilled labor and the dominance of process trading in the export structure provide no effective incentive for ªrms to innovate. The indigenous R&D of individual ªrms has no signiªcant impact on technical change. However, it has contributed signiªcantly to efªciency improvement, which reºects the catch-up process. This is not surprising given the fact revealed from the First National Economic Census in 2004 that about 95 percent of total business R&D expenditure was spent on development and only 5 percent was spent on basic scientiªc research. Interestingly, R&D activities in the domestic ªrms at the industry level have shown signiªcant and robust positive spillovers on the technical progress of indigenous ªrms. This evidence suggests that it is collective indigenous R&D activities, namely, R&D at the industry level, which push up the technology frontier and drive the technology upgrading of indigenous ªrms. R&D activities of foreign invested ªrms at the industry level have shown a negative spillover effect on the technical change of indigenous ªrms but a positive spillover effect on technological catch-up. This may be explained by the competition effects from the foreign R&D activities and the ªndings of recent studies that the core technology development of MNEs still remain at the headquarters, while applied research and adaptation are the main tasks of its afªliates in foreign countries. Therefore, these R&D activities may not contribute to technical change but their impact on catching up is positive and statistically signiªcant. The spillover effects of R&D investment in ethnic ªrms, however, only show signiªcances when international R&D spillover effects are considered and have opposite signs from those of FIEs. It suggests that the R&D activities from ethnic ªrms at the industry level can help to foster technical upgrading, but not technological catch-up.
Determinants of technical change and scale efªciency improvement
In terms of FDI spillover effects, there is no direct FDI impact on efªciency change, but a signiªcant negative impact is detected on technical change. Again, this is likely for ªrms with foreign capital that might tend to keep their core technology re-search at their mother countries. Another explanation may be due to the small share of foreign capitals in the indigenous ªrms, which is no more than 25 percent. There is also no indirect FDI R&D spillover effect on efªciency change, but the impacts for indigenous ªrms with foreign capitals are positively signiªcant at both the ªrm and industry level. This suggests the importance of intra-ªrm technology transfer of the frontier technology through FDI. Foreign investors may transfer the most advanced technology when they have more control of the ªrm.
Conclusions
This paper explores the role of inter-and intranational technological spillovers from FDI in technical change, efªciency improvement, and TFP growth in China. Over the 2001-05 period, our research ªnds that Chinese ªrms have experienced considerable TFP growth at an average annual rate of 4.8 percent. This growth spreads widely across the board, and is mainly due to technical change rather than efªciency improvement. Most of the FDI-dominated industries did not grow as fast as the other industries in terms of TFP growth and technical change. A considerable portion of rapid technical change took place in industries where the indigenous ªrms enjoyed a lead. All this suggests a turning point in China's post-reform era that indigenous industries started to take off in terms of technological progress and productivity growth, and reveals a period with TFP growth, which has been driven by technical change that beneªted from internal and external technological spillovers.
Moreover, contrary to the normal expectations, R&D activities of foreign ªrms in China have exerted a signiªcant productivity depression rather than positive spillover effects on indigenous ªrms. Collective indigenous R&D activities at the industry level are found to be the major driver of technology upgrading of indigenous ªrms that push up the technology frontier. However, ªrms with high FDI-intensity are likely to have high TFP growth, which reºects the beneªts from FDI in nontechnological aspects, such as managerial and marketing knowledge.
Finally, FDI, especially from non-ethnic Chinese investors, is proved to serve as an effective vehicle and facilitator of international transfer of technological knowledge. Interactions of international R&D stock and FDI openness at the ªrm level and industry level show a signiªcant positive effect on the technical change of indigenous ªrms. However, the role of ethnic Chinese investment is rather controversial in this respect. Ethnic Chinese investors appear to confer only beneªts in market access and managerial knowledge that mix the advantages of Western and Eastern management philosophies.
Findings from this research have important policy implications. Developing countries should not simply reply on FDI for indigenous technological upgrading. In the increasingly globalizing world when countries, regions, and ªrms are adopting more open innovation systems, they can use both internal and external knowledge sources for technology upgrading and productivity growth. The role of indigenous innovation, especially collective indigenous innovation efforts shall not be overlooked. Science and technology policies should be introduced to encourage innovation by indigenous ªrms so as to build up dynamic indigenous technological capabilities. On the other hand, FDI, especially from industrialized countries, should be encouraged as this type of investment does serve as an effective conduit of advanced foreign technological knowledge. This provides a role for trade and industry policies in developing countries to distinguish different sources of FDI and attract more FDI from industrialized countries.
